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Abstract—The equilibrium is derived in a real options game
on the basis of a multidimensional state variable. In the game,
ﬁrms optimize both investment time and project choice in
projects that have not been chosen by the leading competitors.
We demonstrate how the equilibrium changes with the number
of ﬁrms, the number of projects, and the correlation between
project values. Consistent with previous ﬁndings, an increase in
the number of ﬁrms and a decrease in the number of projects
reduce the option value in equilibrium. A new ﬁnding suggests
that the option value decreases when the numbers of both ﬁrms
and projects increase by the same amount. Most interestingly, a
high correlation between project values plays a positive role in
mitigating preemptive competition, unlike in a monopoly. The
results complement the literature of both real options games
and max-options, and entails new empirical implications.
Index Terms—ﬁnancial engineering, real options game, op-
tions on multiple assets, optimal stopping game, max-option
I. INTRODUCTION
T
HIS paper investigates the nature of a real options game
based on multiple assets. The real options approach, in
which option pricing theory is applied to capital budgeting
decisions, better enables us to ﬁnd an optimal investment
strategy and project valuation involving uncertainty and
ﬂexibility, than the conventional Net Present Value (NPV)
method could (see [1]). Although the early literature on real
options focuses on a monopolist’s investment, many papers
have recently investigated real options games, in which game
theory, combined with option pricing theory, is applied to
strategic interactions among ﬁrms competing in the same
market.
Studies such as [2], [3], and [4] derive the equilibrium
in a duopoly under the preemption game (non-zero-sum
optimal stopping game1) framework, while [6], [7], and [8]
derive the equilibrium in a oligopoly under the Cournot–
Nash framework. The competitive equilibrium has been
investigated in [1] and [9].2 The main result of these studies
is that competition among ﬁrms reduces option value and
accelerates the exercise of real options. This prediction has
been supported by empirical tests in [12] and [13].
The previous studies on real options games assume one-
dimensional Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) to be the
stochastic process (the state variable) that represents the
future cash ﬂow from a project. This is because explicit
results are more appealing due to the difﬁculty of model
calibration in many real options models; although such
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1Most of the literature of real options games models competition among
rival ﬁrms into a non-zero-sum game, while the game options literature,
provoked by [5], tends to focus on a zero-sum game for a buyer and a seller.
This is a main difference between real options games and game options.
2In contrast, [10] and [11] investigate the agency problem in a single ﬁrm
under the mechanism design framework.
simpliﬁcation could be justiﬁed for a problem concerning
a single investment project, a problem involving several
projects should be modeled by a multidimensional state
variable. In fact, several papers have investigated a mo-
nopolist’s investment decision involving two projects using
a model with a bidimensional state variable. For example,
[14] investigates land development timing with an alternative
land use choice and [15] investigates timing in switching
methods of nuclear waste disposal. The former studies a
sort of American max-option, while the latter deals with an
American spread option.3
However, there have been few studies investigating a real
options game based on a multidimensional state variable.4
The contribution of this paper is to derive the equilibrium in a
duopoly and oligopoly, taking into account multiple projects
of which value follows a multidimensional state variable.
We consider the game where ﬁrms optimize both investment
time and project choice among projects that have not been
chosen by leading competitors. In the game, we reveal how
the investment strategy and the option value in equilibrium
are affected by the number of ﬁrms, the number of projects,
and the correlation between project values.
In equilibrium, consistent with the main result of real
options games, the option value decreases and investment
takes place earlier as the number of ﬁrms increases. In
addition, the option value increases with the number of
projects. This result can be considered an extension of previ-
ous results regarding max-options. Thus, this paper links the
studies on real options games and max-options. Furthermore,
this paper reveals how the equilibrium changes when the
numbers of both ﬁrms and projects change; we show that
the option value decreases and investment is hastened when
the numbers of both ﬁrms and projects increase by the
same amount. Although our model exogenously provides the
number of ﬁrms and the number of projects, in the real world,
the number of ﬁrms tends to increase with the number of
alternatives in the market. Our result enforces the robustness
of the main result of real options games.
Another new ﬁnding is that a high correlation between
the values of alternatives plays a positive role in moderating
competition among ﬁrms. This is in sharp contrast with the
previous ﬁndings in a monopoly where, as pointed out in the
max-option literature, the high correlation reduces the value
of project choice and accelerates investment. In a duopoly
and an oligopoly, the high correlation leads to the opposite
effects of moderating the competition (positive effect) and
reducing the value of project choice (negative effect). The
tradeoff determines the sensitivity of the correlation with
3Refer to [16] and [17] for details of American options on multiple assets.
4Although in several papers a problem with a bidimensional state variable
is reduced to a one-dimensional case by homogeneity, such cases are very
restrictive. A noted exception is [18] who investigate the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium in the R&D competition with both demand and cost shocks.
Due to the model complexity, their results are mainly derived from the
numerical examples.respect to the option value in equilibrium. In particular, when
there is an equal number of projects and ﬁrms, the high cor-
relation increases the option value. This paper complements
the literature of real options games by revealing the effects of
the correlation and complementing the max-option literature
in terms of the strategic interactions.
Although the new prediction has yet to be empirically
investigated, it has the potential to account for the non-
monotonicity pointed out by [13]. Their empirical work ﬁnds
that, investment in medium-concentration industries takes
place earlier than in not only high-concentration industries
but also in low-concentration industries. Our results highlight
the signiﬁcance of the correlation between project values in
addition to industry concentration.
Finally, we address real-world cases to which the model
applies. The model could potentially account for competition
in mergers and acquisitions. For instance, in the pharmaceu-
tical industry, large corporations strategically acquire venture
businesses that develop new drugs. In a large-scale case,
a ﬁrm must choose between several targets due to budget
constraint. Because many mergers and acquisitions take place
by private negotiation rather than through a public bidding
process, preemptive competition occurs among the acquiring
ﬁrms. When a ﬁrm is preempted by its rival, it will choose
an alternative venture business (plan B). The model is also
closely related to strategic interactions among real estate
developers. As documented in [14], a developer has several
options of land uses. The value of each land use is greatly
affected by land development that is done by other developers
in the same area. Some developers that are preempted by its
rivals are obliged to develop land for an alternative use (plan
B).
II. PRELIMINARIES
Consider a ﬁrm that has an option to invest in a project.
Consider two kinds of projects denoted by i = 1;2. When
a ﬁrm conducts project i at time t, it receives temporary
project value Xi(t).5 The investment in project i requires
an irreversible capital expenditure of Ii(> 0). Assume that
project value Xi(t) follows a nonnegative diffusion process
under the risk-neutral measure:
dXi(t) = i(Xi(t);t)dt + i(Xi(t);t)dBi(t); (1)
where (B1(t);B2(t)) is a bidimensional Brownian Motion
(BM) with correlation coefﬁcient . Mathematically, the
model is built on the ﬁltered probability space (Ω;F;P;Ft)
generated by (B1(t);B2(t)). The set Ft means the available
information set to time t, and a ﬁrm optimizes its investment
strategy under this information. Let r(> 0) and T(> 0)
denote the constant risk-free rate and maturity of the option,
respectively.
A. Valuation in a monopoly with a single project
As a benchmark, we consider a ﬁrm that has a monopolis-
tic option to invest in a single project i. This option can be
regarded as an American call option. At time t(< T) with
5This is regarded as the discounted cash ﬂow during the lifetime of project
i.
the state variable Xi(t) = xi, the option value is equal to
the value function of the optimal stopping problem:6
V 1
i (xi;t) := sup
∈Tt
E
xi
t [e−r(−t)(Xi() − Ii)1{≤T}]; (2)
where Tt denotes the set of all stopping times  satisfying
 ≥ t and E
xi
t [·] is the expectation conditional on Xi(t) =
xi. Throughout the paper, the superscript and the subscript
on V 1
i represent the number of ﬁrms and available project(s),
respectively; that is, V 1
i in (2) means the value function in
a monopoly with a single project i.
We restrict our attention to a diffusion process X(t)
satisfying the following assumptions:
Assumption (i) The value function V 1
i (xi;t) is con-
tinuous and strictly increasing with respect to xi and
limxi↓0 V 1
i (xi;t) = 0.
Assumption (ii) There exists a ﬁnite threshold x1
i(t) such
that the optimal stopping time 1
i (t) for problem (2) is
written as
1
i (t) = inf{s ≥ t | Xi(s) ∈ [x1
i(s);∞)}: (3)
Deﬁne S1
1(s) := [x1
1(s);∞) × R+ and S1
2(s) := R+ ×
[x1
2(s);∞). Then, the optimal investment time i(t) is written
as inf{s ≥ t | X(s) ∈ S1
i (s)}. The assumptions are not
restrictive. Indeed, we can take a wide range of diffusion
processes including a GBM, i.e., i(Xi(t);t) = iXi(t)
and i(Xi(t);t) = iXi(t) where i(< r) and i(> 0) are
constant, and a process with a mean-reverting growth rate,
i.e., i(Xi(t);t) = (m−Xi(t)) and i(Xi(t);t) = iXi(t)
where ;m and i are positive constants.
When X(t) follows a GBM and the maturity is inﬁnite,
V 1
i (xi;t) is explicitly derived independently from time t. In
fact, the option value V 1
i (xi) is expressed as
V 1
i (xi) =



(
xi
x1
i
)i
(x1
i − Ii) (0 ≤ xi < x1
i)
xi − Ii (xi ≥ x1
i):
(4)
The constant threshold x1
i is deﬁned by
x1
i =
i
i − 1
Ii; (5)
where i := 1=2 − i=2
i +
√
(i=2
i − 1=2)2 + 2r=2
i (>
1). Similarly, when X(t) follows a process with a mean-
reverting process and the maturity is inﬁnite, the option value
is explicit and independent of time t. For details, refer to [1].
B. Valuation in a duopoly with a single project
This subsection considers two identical ﬁrms that compete
for a single project i. Throughout the paper, we assume a
winner-take-all game as follows:
Assumption (iii) A ﬁrm cannot invest in the project in which
the other ﬁrm has already invested.
Suppose time t with Xi(t) = xi ≤ Ii for i = 1;2. The
duopoly game is solved backward. We begin by supposing
that one of the ﬁrms (the leader) has ﬁrst invested at time
s ∈ [t;T], and we ﬁnd the optimal decision of the other
(the follower). Because the follower’s opportunity to invest
is removed, the follower’s value is zero. On the other hand,
6When the maturity is inﬁnite, we have only to replace 1fTg with
1f<1g.the leader’s value is Xi(s)−Ii at the time of investment. In
the situation where neither ﬁrm has invested, ﬁrms attempt
to preempt each other in order to obtain the leader’s project
value if Xi(s) − Ii > 0. Deﬁne S2
1(s) := [I1;∞) × R+ and
S2
2(s) := R+ × [I2;∞). In equilibrium, both ﬁrms attempt
to invest at
2
i (t) := inf{s ≥ t | X(s) ∈ S2
i (s)} (6)
and hence the option value becomes
V 2
i (xi;t) := 0; (7)
where the superscript 2 and the subscript i represent a
duopoly with a single project i. In other words, the pre-
emptive competition completely removes the value of option
to invest in project i.
Strictly speaking, both ﬁrms’ investment strategy at (6)
proves to be a Nash equilibrium in the optimal stopping
game under the assumption that if two ﬁrms choose the
same timing, one of the ﬁrms is chosen as the leader with
probability 1=2. Most studies, including [2] and [3], are built
on this assumption. Then, the equilibrium means that one of
the ﬁrms invests in project i at time (6), while the other
cannot undertake the project. The value of the leader, who is
selected randomly, is zero because of investing too early. This
is the well-known preemptive equilibrium in a real options
game. For details of real options games, refer to [19].
C. Valuation in a monopoly with two projects
This subsection considers a ﬁrm that has a monopolistic
option to invest in a single project between projects 1;2.
The model applies not only to a case in which two projects
are mutually exclusive (e.g., alternative land use) but also to
a case where a ﬁrm must choose between projects due to
budget constraint (e.g., large merger and acquisition trans-
action). This type of option is classiﬁed as American max-
options. European max-options have been studied in [20]
and [21], while American max-options have been studied
in [14], [16], and [17]. Although a max-option commonly
has a multidimensional state variable, [22] studies a max-
option that is written on a one-dimensional state variable,
i.e.,  = 1;x1 ̸= x2, and I1 ̸= I2, in order to investigate
investment timing with an alternative scale choice.
At time t(< T) with X(t) = x, the option value is equal
to the value function of the optimal stopping problem as
follows:
V 1
1;2(x;t) := sup
∈Tt
Ex
t [e−r(−t) max
i=1;2
(Xi() − Ii)
      
project choice
1{≤T}]:
(8)
Recall that V 1
1;2 in (8) means the value function in a
monopoly with projects 1;2. The optimal stopping time 1
1;2
for problem (8) is written as
1
1;2(t) = inf{s ≥ t | X(s) ∈ S1
1;2(s)}; (9)
where the stopping region S1
1;2(s) is deﬁned by
S1
1;2(s) := {x ∈ R2
+ | V 1
1;2(x;s) = max
i=1;2
(xi − Ii)}: (10)
The stopping region S1
1;2(s) proves to be the union of two
disjoint convex sets corresponding to the immediate exercise
region of each project, when X(t) follows a GBM. For
details, refer to [14], [17].
Let us now focus on two symmetric projects, i.e., x1 =
x2, 1(·;·) = 2(·;·);1(·;·) = 2(·;·), and I1 = I2. In
this case, the larger the correlation coefﬁcient , the more
likely it is that the project values X1(t) and X2(t) take close
values. The option value V 1
1;2 decreases and the stopping
region S1
1;2 enlarges with , because the higher  reduces
the value of project choice. In particular, in the case of the
perfect correlation, i.e.,  = 1, the option value V 1
1;2 and the
investment time 1
1;2, agree with those in a monopoly with
a single project, i.e., V 1
i and 1
i , respectively. The effects
of the correlation will be compared in detail with that of a
duopoly with two projects in Section 3.
The following section is the main contribution of the paper.
Although the results can be readily extended to the case of
a oligopoly with multiple projects, we present the details of
a duopoly with two projects in order to avoid unnecessary
confusion.
III. MAIN RESULTS
This section investigates two identical ﬁrms that compete
for two projects 1;2.7 Recall Assumption (iii). When one of
the ﬁrms (the leader) undertakes a project, the other (the
follower) is deprived of the opportunity to invest in that
project. Firms attempt to preempt each other in order to
gain the ﬁrst-mover’s advantage in project choice. Assume
that the ﬁrst mover cannot invest in the remaining project.
Otherwise, as in Section 2.B, both ﬁrms compete for the
remaining project and gain no value from the project. Then, it
follows from backward reasoning that the equilibrium value
becomes zero in the situation where neither ﬁrm has invested.
As mentioned in Section 1, the model can be applied to
strategic interactions in acquisitions and land development.
Consider time t(< T) with Xi(t) = xi ≤ Ii for i = 1;2.
As in Section 2.B, the problem is solved backward. Supposed
that one of the ﬁrms (the leader) has ﬁrst invested in the better
project i(s) at time s ∈ [t;T], where the function i(s)8 is
deﬁned by
i(s) := arg max
i=1;2
(Xi(s) − Ii); (11)
we ﬁnd the optimal response of the other ﬁrm (follower).
Because the follower has the monopolistic option to invest
in a single project i ̸= i(s), the option value and the optimal
investment time coincide with V 1
i and 1
i (cf. (2) and (3)).
On the other hand, the leader’s project value is equal to
maxi=1;2(Xi(s) − Ii).
Let us return to the situation where neither ﬁrm has
invested. Intuitively, in equilibrium the leader’s advantage in
project choice is offset by too early and inefﬁcient investment
timing. Deﬁne the region S2F
1;2(s) where the leader’s value
dominates that of the follower as follows:
S2F
1;2(s) := {x ∈ R2
+ | x1 − I1 ≥ V 1
2 (x2;s)}
∪{x ∈ R2
+ | x2 − I2 ≥ V 1
1 (x1;t)}:
7For simplicity, this paper concentrates on the identical ﬁrms. Although
similar (but messy) results follow from the same logic in the asymmetric
case, interesting insights can be better observed in the symmetric case.
8We do not have to be concerned about the value of i(s) when X1(s) 
I1 = X2(s)   I2.Each ﬁrm attempts to preempt the competitor when X(s) ∈
S2F
1;2(s). In addition, one of the ﬁrms is forced to invest for
X(s) ∈ S1
1(s) ∪ S1
2(s), if it knows that the other waits until
2F
1;2(t) := inf{s ≥ t | X(s) ∈ S2F
1;2(s)}: (12)
This is because for X(s) ∈ S1
1(s) ∪ S1
2(s) the immediate
exercise yields a higher value than the option value to wait
until 2F
1;2. Note that, in this equilibrium, the follower’s value
is higher than that of the leader. For details, refer to the
proof of Proposition 1. Therefore, the preemptive investment
region S2
1;2(s) becomes
S2
1;2(s) := S2F
1;2(s) ∪ S1
1(s) ∪ S1
2(s): (13)
The preemptive investment takes place at time
2
1;2(t) := inf{s ≥ t | X(s) ∈ S2
1;2(s)}: (14)
It is easily checked that the boundary of S2
1;2(s) can be
expressed as
@S2
1;2(s)
= {x ∈ R2
+ | xi ≤ x1
i′(s) − Ii′ + Ii;xi − Ii = V 1
i′(xi′;s)}
      
(a)
∪{x ∈ R2
+ | xi′ ≤ x1
i′(s);xi′ − Ii′ = V 1
i (xi;s)}
      
(b)
∪{x ∈ R2
+ | xi′ = x1
i′(s);
      
(c)
(V 1
i )−1(x1
i′(s) − Ii′) ≤ xi ≤ x1
i′(s) − Ii′ + Ii}
      
(c)
; (15)
where i and i′(̸= i) (which may depend on s) satisfy
x1
i(s) − Ii ≥ x1
i′(s) − Ii′: (16)
Throughout the paper, we denote by i′ for i′ ̸= i. In (16),
(V 1
i )−1(·) (which may depend on s) denotes the inverse
function for V 1
i (·;s). Note that this function is well deﬁned
by Assumption (i).
Figure 1 illustrates the preemptive investment boundary
@S2
1;2(s). The part (a) is the region where the leader’s
investment in project i generates the same value as the
follower’s option value to invest in project i′. Similarly, the
part (b) is the region where the leader’s investment in project
i′ generates the same value as the follower’s option value to
invest in project i. In the part (c), both ﬁrms prefer to be
the follower with project i to being the leader with project i′
due to X(s) = ∈ S2F
1;2(s). In equilibrium, as will be proved in
Proposition 1, one of the ﬁrms invests when X(s) hits the
part (c). We see from (15) that, unlike S1
1;2 in a monopoly,
the preemptive investment region S2
1;2 is independent of the
correlation coefﬁcient .
At time t(< T) with X(t) = x, the option value of the
leader is written as
V 2
1;2(x;t) := Ex
t [e−r(
2
1;2(t)−t) max
i=1;2
(Xi(2
1;2(t)) − Ii)
×1{2
1;2(t)≤T}]: (17)
This value is lower than that of the follower if and only if
the process X(t) hits the part (c).
So far, we intuitively explain the equilibrium. More pre-
cisely, we need to formulate the following optimal stopping
(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 1. The preemptive investment boundary @S2
1;2(s)
game for two identical ﬁrms j = 1;2. The set of actions is
deﬁned by
A(t) := {(;i) |  ∈ Tt;i : Fmeasurable random
variable taking values in {0;1}}:
For ﬁrm 1’s action (1;i1) ∈ A(t) and ﬁrm 2’s action
(2;i2) ∈ A(t), the payoff of ﬁrm 1 is deﬁned by
1(1;i1;2;i2)
:= Ex
t [e−r(1−t)(Xi1(1) − Ii1)
      
leader’s value
1{1<2}∩{1≤T}
+e−r(2−t)V 1
i′
2(Xi′
2(2);2)
      
follower’s value
1{1>2}∩{2≤T}
+
e−r(1−t)
2
(Xi1(1) − Ii1 + V 1
i′
2(Xi′
2(2);2))
      
average of leader’s and follower’s value
×1{1=2}∩{1≤T}]:
The last term corresponds to the assumption that if two
ﬁrms choose the same timing, one of the ﬁrms is chosen
as the leader with probability 1=2. The payoff of ﬁrm
2 (denoted by 2(1;i1;2;i2)) is deﬁned symmetrically.
A Nash equilibrium (˜ 1; ˜ i1; ˜ 2; ˜ i2) ∈ A(t) × A(t) of the
stopping game satisﬁes both
1(˜ 1; ˜ i1; ˜ 2; ˜ i2) = max
(1;i1)∈A(t)
1(1;i1; ˜ 2; ˜ i2); (18)
and
2(˜ 1; ˜ i1; ˜ 2; ˜ i2) = max
(2;i2)∈A(t)
2(˜ 1; ˜ i1;2;i2): (19)
We assume that for (17) the diffusion process X(t) satis-
ﬁes9
Assumption (iv)
max
i=1;2
(xi − Ii) ≤ V 2
1;2(x;t) (x = ∈ S2
1;2(t)):
9We have not established any proof, but the assumption is satisﬁed in
many cases as far as we can judge from a wide range of computations.The following proposition shows that the pair of actions
(2
12(t);i(2
12(t));2F
12 (t);i(2F
12 (t))) ∈ A(t)×A(t) is a Nash
equilibrium of the stopping game, where the stopping times
2
12(t);2F
12 (t) are deﬁned by (14),(12), and the functions
i(2
12(t));i(2F
12 (t)) are deﬁned by (11), respectively.
Proposition 1 (2
12(t);i(2
12(t));2F
12 (t);i(2F
12 (t))) is a
Nash equilibrium of the stopping game.
Proposition 1 includes the equilibrium in a duopoly with
a single project. Indeed, for xi > xi′ = 0, the equilibrium in
Proposition 1 agrees with that of Section 2.B. Accordingly,
Proposition 1 extends the previous results to a more general
case in which there are two opportunities to invest in. For
most of the diffusion process Xi(t), a higher volatility i
leads to a higher option value V 1
i and a later investment
time 1
i . If this is the case, by (15) the preemptive investment
region S2
1;2 decreases, which leads to a higher option value
V 2
1;2 and a later investment time 2
1;2 in equilibrium. Then,
the effects of volatility i in a duopoly remain unchanged
from a monopoly.
If X(t) follows a GBM and T = ∞, we have an explicit
form of the time homogeneous investment boundary @S2
1;2
by (4), (5) and (15) .
Corollary 1 Assume that T = ∞, i(Xi(t);t) = iXi(t),
and i(Xi(t);t) = iXi(t), where i(< r) and i(> 0) are
constant for i = 1;2. The preemptive investment boundary
is equal to
@S2
1;2
=
{
xi ≤ x1
i′ − I′
i + Ii;xi − Ii =
(
xi′
x1
i′
)i′
(x1
i′ − Ii′)
}
∪
{
xi′ ≤ x1
i′;xi′ − Ii′ =
(
xi
x1
i
)i
(x1
i − Ii)
}
∪
{
xi′ = x1
i′;(V 1
i )−1(x1
i′ − Ii′) ≤ xi ≤ x1
i′ − Ii′ + Ii
}
;
where i (which does not depend on s) satisﬁes (16).
The explicit form of the investment boundary @S2
1;2 would
be useful for applications of the model. The option value V 2
1;2
(cf. (17)) can be expressed as the solution of the correspond-
ing partial differential equation with the boundary @S2
1;2.
Then, we can compute S2
1;2 and V 2
1;2 without difﬁculty.
For a general diffusion process X(t) we can show the
following properties of the preemptive investment region
S2
1;2(s), the timing 2
1;2(t), and the option value V 2
1;2(x;t).
Proposition 2 The following relationships hold for all i =
1;2:
Investment region
S1
1;2(s) ⊂ S1
1(s) ∪ S1
2(s) ⊂ S2
1;2(s) ⊂ S2
1(s) ∪ S2
2(s); (20)
Investment timing
min(2
1(t);2
2(t)) ≤ 2
1;2(t) ≤ min(1
1(t);1
2(t)) ≤ 1
1;2(t);
(21)
Option value
0 = V 2
i (xi;t) ≤ V 2
1;2(x;t) ≤ V 1
i (xi;t) ≤ V 1
1;2(x;t): (22)
Proposition 2 reveals that the option value decreases
and investment takes place earlier as the number of ﬁrms
increases. This is in line with both theoretical and empirical
results in real options games (e.g., [2], [6], [12], and [13]).
The inequality V 2
i (xi;t) ≤ V 2
1;2(x;t) means that the option
value increases with the number of projects in a duopoly.
This result extends the previous result for American max-
options in a monopoly (e.g., [14], [16], and [17]) into that
of a duopoly. Thus, we bridge the gap between the studies
on real options games and those on American max-options.
In addition, Proposition 2 reveals how the equilibrium
changes when the numbers of both ﬁrms and projects change.
Indeed, the inequalities, V 2
1;2(x;t) ≤ V 1
i (x;t);2
1;2(t) ≤
min(1
1(t);1
2(t)), demonstrate that the option value de-
creases and investment is hastened when the numbers of both
ﬁrms and projects increase by the same amount. While we
exogenously provide the numbers of both ﬁrms and opportu-
nities, in reality, the number of ﬁrms tends to increase with
the number of opportunities. Taking this into consideration,
our new result can be positioned as an extension of the
previous works into a more practical setting.
We now consider two symmetric projects, i.e., x1 = x2,
1(·;·) = 2(·;·);1(·;·) = 2(·;·), and I1 = I2. In the
sensitivity analysis, we focus on the correlation coefﬁcient 
because the previous strategic models with a one-dimensional
state variable cannot reveal the comparative statics with re-
spect to . For instance, [23] investigates a duopoly with two
projects, but they cannot capture the effects of the correlation
between project values due to the one-dimensional model. By
Proposition 2, we can easily show the following corollary.
Corollary 2 Consider the symmetric projects i = 1;2. The
following equalities hold for the correlation coefﬁcient :
max
∈[−1;1]
V 2
1;2(x;t) = V 1
i (xi;t) = min
∈[−1;1]
V 1
1;2(x;t); (23)
where  = 1 maximizes V 2
1;2(x;t) and minimizes V 1
1;2(x;t).
Corollary 2 highlights a difference between max-options
in a monopoly and in a duopoly. In a monopoly, as is noted
in the max-option literature, the high correlation reduces the
value of project choice. Conversely, the high correlation in a
duopoly plays a positive role in mitigating preemptive com-
petition and increasing the option value. Note that the high
correlation reduces the ﬁrst-mover’s advantage in project
choice. This ﬁnding complements the max-option literature
by demonstrating the positive effect of the high correlation
in combination with strategic interactions.
In addition, this result may account for the non-
monotonicity in the investment speed with respect to in-
dustry concentration. [13] ﬁnds that investment in medium-
concentration industries takes place earlier than in not only
high-concentration industries but also in low-concentration
industries. One ﬁrm is more likely to beneﬁt from the failure
of a speciﬁc rival in higher-concentration industries than in
lower-concentration industries with numerous ﬁrms. Taking
account of industry-wide uncertainty, the correlation among
ﬁrm values tends to be high in low-concentration industries.
This high correlation could mitigate preemptive competition
and delay investment later than in medium-concentration
industries. In our view, the option value depends not onlyon the numbers of both ﬁrms and projects but also on the
correlation between project values.
We compare the option value V 2
1;2 in a duopoly with that
of American min-option in a monopoly. The exercise of the
min-option at time , unlike the max-option, yields the payoff
mini=1;2(Xi()−Ii). At time t(≤ T) with Xi(t) = xi, the
option value of American min-option is the value function
of the optimal stopping problem as follows:
V 1
min(x;t) := sup
∈Tt
Ex
t [e−r(−t) min
i=1;2
(Xi() − Ii)1{≤T}]:
(24)
This type of option is investigated in [24] and [17]. We
can show that V 1
min(x;t) ≤ V 2
1;2(x;t), where the equality
holds for the symmetric projects with  = 1, as follows. Let
S1
min(s) be the stopping region for problem (24). Consider
the boundary of S2
1;2(s) ∪ S1
min(s). For x ∈ @S2
1;2(s) \
S1
min(s), V 2
1;2(x;s) is either V 1
1 (x;s) or V 1
2 (x;s) which
is lager than V 1
min(x;s). For x ∈ @S1
min(s) \ S2
1;2(s),
V 1
min(x;s) is equal to mini=1;2(xi − Ii) which is smaller
than V 2
1;2(x;s) under Assumption (iv). Then, we have
V 1
min(x;s) ≤ V 2
1;2(x;s) on the boundary. For the hitting time
˜  to the boundary, we have
V 1
min(x;t) = Ex
t [e−r(~ −t)V 1
min(X(˜ ); ˜ )1{~ ≤T}]
≤ Ex
t [e−r(~ −t)V 2
1;2(X(˜ ); ˜ )1{~ ≤T}]
= V 2
1;2(x;t):
Then, the option value V 2
1;2 in a duopoly is higher than the
min-option value V 1
min.
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